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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

LINCOLN FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
d/b/a CHEVY CHASE APARTMENTS,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 1l|296

DOROTHY S. FERRIER,
Defendant,
Cross Claimant,
and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
* * * * * * * * *

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
The Plaintiff-Respondent, hereinafter called Respondent, controverts
the statement of the kind of case of Defendant-Appellant, hereinafter called
Appellant, in the following particulars:
1•

This action was commenced by Respondent against Appellant on a

written "month to month" lease agreement and also pursuant to Title 78,
Chapter 36, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, said lease being referred
to in the complaint and a copy thereof attached to the complaint on file
(R. 1-3, inc.)2.

Bie answer and counterclaim on file did not conform to the

requirements of Rule

11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (R. 8-12, inc.)*

-1-
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3•

The counterclaim on file includes matters in the same count

which are independent of the issue of unlawful detainer, or a defense thereto
(R. 9-12, inc.).
Ihe Respondent, to save space and repetition, will abbreviate the
following throughout this brief, namely: Record as "R.

"j inclusive

as "inc."; Appellant's Brief as "App. Br.,fj Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended, as "U.C.A"; Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as "U.R.C.P"; and Title
78, Chapter 36, U.C.A., 1953, entitled Forcible Entry and Detainer, as
"Unlawful Detainer."
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Hie lower court, the Honorable Calvin Gould, District Judge, presiding,
granted Respondent's motion for summary judgment on its complaint, and the
court ordered that Appellant's answer and counterclaim be stricken as a
sham pursuant to Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and a judgment were made and entered accordingly
(R. 26-30, inc.).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The lower court's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment
should not be disturbed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Respondent controverts the Appellant's statement of facts in the
following particulars:
1«

The Appellant's statement of facts is argumentative and recites

matters not in evidence, not relevant to this appeal, and not helpful to
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resolution of the issues on this appeal.
2.

The pleadings on file speak for themselves (R. 1-5, inc., and

8-12, inc.).
A concise statement of facts is reflected by the record.

The Respondent

was the landlord, and Appellant was the tenant, of apartment #22 in an
apartment house complex known as Chevy Chase in Weber County, Utah, as is
more fully set out in the complaint and in Exhibit "A" attached to the
complaint on file (R. 1-3, inc.).

On June 10, 1975, Respondent issued a

notice directed to Appellant terminating her tenancy at the end of June, 1975,
(R. 5), and said notice was personally served on Appellant by the Weber County
Sheriff's Office on June 10, 1975, (R. U ) . Appellant failed to vacate said
premises on or before July 1, 1975, and this action was commenced by a complaint filed on July 25, 1975, (R» 1), and process was served on Appellant
by the Weber County Sheriff's Office on July 31, 1975, (R. 6-7, inc.).

On

August 21, 1975, a default judgment was entered (R. 1ii), and on the same day
an answer and counterclaim was filed with a copy mailed to Respondent's
counsel (R. 8-12, inc.).

The certificate of mailing shows August 20, 1975,

but, in any event, the answer was not received until August 22, 1975, (R» 39) •
The answer and counterclaim on file is signed by the Appellant, but is not
signed by an attorney (R. 12)•
On August 25, 1975, some four days after the answer was filed,
Appellant caused a tender of rent for two months to be filed and mailed
(R. 15-16).
On September 2, 1975, Respondent prepared and served a consent to set
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aside the default judgment, and motions for summary judgment and dismissal
(R. 18-19).

Appellant objected to Respondent's motions (R. 20-22, inc.).

Hie Respondent's motions were argued to the lower court on September 10,
1975, (R« 2$), and following the oral and written decision (R. 2U) of the
lower court, findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment were entered
on September 29, 1975, (R. 26-30, inc.)*
The Appellant formally tendered possession of the premises to Respondent
in open court on September |0, 1975, although she may have vacated the same
the prior weekend which would be on or about September 6, 1975, (R» UU and

U7-U8).
The record recited above is not in dispute. It should be noted that
the lower court struck Appellant's answer and counterclaim as a sham
pursuant to Rule 11, U.R.C.P., so that there was nothing before that court
which would permit it to pass on the merits of Appellant's claims. The
Appellant's statement of facts assumes that the merits of her claims were
before the lower court, and are now before this Court.

It is not clear how

the merits of the issues raised by the answer and counterclaim could be
before either court if the answer and counterclaim was properly stricken.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT TO POINTS OF ARGUMENT
The Respondent will answer Appellant's points in the order raised, but
Respondent deems it necessary for an orderly exposition of its position to
give this Court an overview of the complex and important issues raised by this
appeal.

The Appellant has attempted to narrow the battlefield by her four

points of argument, but the ultimate significant issues herein are as follows:

-U-
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1. The rights of a landlord to select and regulate his tenants,
to rely upon his written leases, and to rely upon the written statute
and case law for guidance in the control and eviction of tenants;
2.

The relationship and function of the unlawful detainer statutes

in evictions where there is a written lease; and
3.

The power of this Court to adopt and enforce rules of procedure

which are controlling on the conduct of attorneys and litigants•
The law of landlord and tenant has passed through a convulsion with the
pendulum swinging from protection of property rights to protection of
personal rights• The tenants are now demanding rights verging on total
ownership of the properties rented by them including, but not limited to,
rights to designate management, make rules and regulations, withhold rents,
demand improvements, and so on, without concomitant duties to preserve and
protect the premises and the peace*

Conversely, the landlords are so beset

with legal actions on every conceivable theory that they are becoming afraid
to own or manage rental properties*

The upshot is that private capital is

fleeing, government capital has become necessary, and rental premises are
ever diminishing and depreciating to the consternation of every major city
in the United States.
Hie unlawful detainer statutes were enacted in Utah prior to the turn
of the century for the following salutory reasons:

(a) To avoid breaches

of the peace; (b) To provide a quick and inexpensive procedure for
eviction in lieu of ejectment; (c) To provide protection to the tenant
against either forcible or surreptitious evictions without due process
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of law. King v. Firm, 3 U. 2d U19, 285 P. 2d 111U, 1118; 52A C.J.S.,
Landlord and Tenant, Sec. 752, et seq.

The Respondent respectfully suggests

that the unlawful detainer statutes are in no way a derogation of written
leases, except where the statutes and the lease are in direct conflict,
e. g., the right of forcible entry, and that Section 7 8 - 3 6 - 3 , U.C.A.,
makes specific reference therein to written leases. Somehow, Appellant
assumes and argues that an unlawful detainer action extinguishes the written
lease and terras thereof. Respondent believes that the unlawful detainer
statutes merely gave the landlord an alternative possessory remedy in return
for landlord's loss of right of entry commonly provided for at

common law

and In written leases. Statutes providing summary proceedings for recovery
of possession by the landlord do not establish a new cause of action, but
merely create an additional and cumulative remedy.

f>2A C.J.S., Landlord

and Tenant, Sec. 753 & 758. This position is further bolstered by Voyles v«
Straka, 77 Utah 171, 175, 292 Pac. 913 (1930), wherein this Court held that
the right to recover rents is separate from the right to recover possession,
and that the two rights are not merged by the unlawful detainer statutes.
The Appellant acknowledges the better practice might be to separate
the lease claims from the unlawful detainer claims in separate counts,
but objection was not made thereto, both claims were based on a twenty day
summons (rather than a three day), and it has always been the policy of the
law to avoid multiplicity of actions.
The remaining significant public policy issue in this case involves
the control of members of the bar by the courts in the judicial process.
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The wave of the future may very well be the extensive use of paralegals
by attorneys, for which see attached exhibits from recent periodicals.
Paralegals are not subject to discipline nor control by the courts or
bar associations*

They are unidentified and anonymous, hiding behind the

cloak of a licensed lawyer, yet wielding great power and authority when
not totally supervised.

An exconvict client of this writer suggests that

the best lawyers in the country are in the penitentiaries, and the thought
is intriguing as to what these paralegals could do if the bar associations
and courts abdicate their authority.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED
RESPONDENT REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES.
The landlord-tenant relationship between Respondent and Appellant
was based upon a written agreement which contained therein, paragraph 9,
a provision for attorney's fees (R. 3)* The complaint on file specifically
refers to, and incorporates, said lease as a part of said complaint (R. 1-3,
inc.).

The action was commenced on a twenty day summons (R. 6), so that

summary "unlawful detainer" proceedings are not inconsistent with an action
on the lease.
This Court has held that reasonable attorney's fees may be awarded
to the prevailing party when provided for by statute or contract.

Blake v.

Blake, 1? U.2d 369, 372, 1*12 P.2d k9xi Pacific Coast Title v, Hartford
Ace. & Ind. Co., 7 U.2d 377, 325 P.2d 906.
These proceedings were necessary because of Appellant's refusal to

-7-
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vacate. Tender of rent after unlawful detainer arose is irrelevant, and
acceptance of such rent by Respondent would have waived the unlawful detainer.
J>2A C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, Sec. 7?l*.
An argument can be made, as it was in Milliner v. Farmer, 2\x U.2d 326,
U71 P*2d 151, that a written lease is extinguished by commencement of
unlawful detainer proceedings. This Court skirted the issue in the Milliner
case by noting a stipulation in said case.

Trie fact is, however, that an

unlawful detainer proceeding is a cumulative remedy only, 52A C.J.S.,
Landlord and Tenant, Sec. 753 and 758, and Voyles v. Straka, supra, and
that many issues involved in a lease cannot be resolved in an unlawful
detainer proceeding.

If this Court holds that a written lease and all pro-

visions therein are extinguished by unlawful detainer proceedings, then,
and in such event, an oral month to month tenancy is superior to a written
lease, summary proceedings are not available to a landlord on a written
lease without waiver of the lease, and the landlord will be deprived of one
of the few protections he has, namely, of evicting a tenant efficiently
and inexpensively without waiving such issues as damages to the premises
and other breaches of the lease agreement which often can only be determined
after eviction.
The Respondent respectfully suggests that much of the existing
confusion concerning the applicability of the unlawful detainer law to
written leases arises out of this Court's extension of the use of unlawful
detainer to vendor-vendee transactions.

Appellant has made a bold effort

to perpetuate this confusion by citing Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah 137, 292

.8-
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Pac. 206, and Leone V. Zuniga, 8U Utah 1*17, 3k P-2d 699, both of which
initially involved real estate contracts*

The real estate contracts were

forfeited, extinguished in theory, and the vendee was converted to a tenant
at will, following which unlawful detainer proceedings were commenced.

In

other words, the vendor elected an option to extinguish the real estate
contract, leaving only an oral landlord-tenant relationship in existence
for the court to pass on in unlawful detainer proceedings. An action for
unlawful detainer presupposes existence of the relation of landlord and
tenant, Holladay Coal Co. v. Kirker, 20 Utah 192, $7 Pac. 882, and is not
available for use in the vendor-vendee relationship. A written lease
presupposes a landlord-tenant relationship and does not require any conversion to another relationship.
Incidentally, the Court will note that Appellant alleges and prays
for attorneys fees in her counterclaim (R. 10-11) without either contract
or statute to support the same. The writer would hope that one day this
Court will explicitly rule on the propriety of such allegation and prayer,
and whether such attorneys fees may be awarded as a part of damages where
exemplary damages are claimed.
It is respectfully submitted that the Respondent did not waive its
written lease by commencement of unlawful detainer proceedings, and that
Respondent is entitled to the benefits of said lease cumulatively, and
not in lieu of the unlawful detainer statutes.

-9-
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ARBITRARILY AWARD
RESPONDENT TREBLE DAMAGES
The Appellant states her Point II in a manner that Respondent cannot
disagree with. Of course, "triple damage should not be arbitrarily awarded."
The issue is whether treble damages were arbitrarily awarded.

And the

arbitrariness of such award depends upon whether Appellant continued in
unlawful detainer, and not whether she tendered rent.
The case of Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah 137, 292 Pac. 206, so often
cited by Appellant, on page 156 of Utah Reports quotes with approval from
Eccles v. U. P. Coal Co., 15 Utah 1U, 20, 1*8 Pac. 1U8, that "The Statute ...
makes it mandatory upon the court to render judgment for three times the
damages assessed" after a finding of damages. And the Forrester case, supra,
also holds that rents and profits, or rental value, during the unlawful
detention of the premises are included in damages, as damages and not rent.
After the unlawful detainer arose, the tender of rent became irrelevant,
because the wrong is in the detainer and not in failure to pay rent.
Both the lease agreement, paragraph 9, (R. 3) and Section 78-36*3(2),
U.C.A., provide that the tenant may be directed to vacate upon fifteen
days notice.

The Respondent had the right to direct the Appellant to

vacate for any legal reason, or for no reason at all. Callister v* Spencer,
113 Utah U97, 196 P.2d 71UJ Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 6875 App. Br. 18.
Hie Respondent caused a notice to vacate to be served on the Appellant
by the Weber County Sheriff's Office on June 10, 1975, some twenty days
before the end of the month (R. 3-U)* The Appellant was in unlawful detainer
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of the subject premises on July 1, 1975, when she failed and refused to
vacate by that day.
This Court is respectfully directed to the additional care and patience
extended to Appellant by Respondent in this case, namely:

(a) legal

proceedings were not commenced until July 25, 1975* (R« 1){ (b) Appellant
was not served with process until July 31, 1975, (R« 7); (c) the summons
provided for a full twenty days in which to answer the complaint (R. 6),
as contrasted with the three day minimum provided for in Section 78 - 3 6 - 8 ,
U.C.A, 1953; and (d) the Respondent refused to take any steps to enter
Appellant's premises until the formal tender thereof in open court, in the
absence of a prior tender by delivery of the keys, (R. 6U).
According to Appellant counsel's representations, Appellant vacated
at the earliest, Saturday, September 6, 1975, and formal tender was made
September 10, 1975, in open court, (App. Br. 9$ R* 1*7).

The Court will

note from the briefs that the offices of counsel for the respective parties
are separated by a short distance, yet the answer and counterclaim were
filed on the day of default, and mailed without any tender indications made
at that time of either possession or rent.
The Appellant makes reference in her statement of facts that "The
premises were owned by an absentee financial corporation under a resident
manager ...ff (App. Br. 3 ) . This statement is no more relevant than is the
fact that Appellant was a public welfare recipient (R. U5), but the point
is that Respondent would certainly have preferred the recovery of its premises
without the enormous expenses and worry incurred herein, rather than a paper

-11-
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judgment of dubious value*

%

*f \ **•* '*•''

J

+

^;

^

ftie Appellant arbitrarily elected to remain on real estate owned by
another, after having been directed in accordance with law to vacate, and
so it is difficult for Respondent to understand how it can be claimed that
the trial court "arbitrarily11 penalized the Appellant. It is customary
for persons to be penalized when they unlawfully possess and use property
belonging to others. Appellant remained on Respondents premises for
approximately two months and ten days after she was directed to vacate.
Incidentally, Respondent feels obliged to respond to Appellantfs statements made on page 9 of her brief, wherein Appellant refers to comments
made by this writer relative to return of the keys (R. 6U). The Respondent
respectfully points out its "no win" position in this case when the Appellant
argues that a formal tender of the premises was not necessary by delivery
of the keys, and yet it is obvious from the Appellant's answer and counterclaim on file (R. 8-12, inc.) that if Respondent had taken any steps to
take possession without a formal tender, then its liability for forcible
entry would have been enhanced, and its defense to this appeal diminished.
It is a favorite game of tenants in recent times to leave a few items behind
to "set the landlord up" for a forcible entry lawsuit promoted by a legal
services or civil rights organization. Further, whatever was discussed
between Appellant and her counsel is irrelevant to this writer and Respondent,
since Respondent had instructions not to converse with Appellant, and professional ethics require this writer, as counsel, to receive communications
from the other counsel. Counsel for Appellant does not contend that he
-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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personally made a tender of the premises to this writer prior to the day
of argument to the trial court.
Respondent respectfully submits that the trial court did not arbitrarily
award treble damages to Respondent, but that such damages were well within
his discretion, if not mandatorily required of him.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THE APPELLANT'S
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM TO BE A SHAM PLEADING
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, reads as follows:
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall
be signed in his individual name by at least one attorney
who is duly licensed to practice in the state of Utah* The
address of the attorney and that of the party shall be stated.
Every party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign
his pleadings and state his address. Except when otherwise
specifically provided by rule, pleadings need not be verified
or accompanied by an affidavit. The signature of any attorney
constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading;
that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief
there is good ground to support it, and that it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not signed or is signed
with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule it may be
stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed as
though the pleading had not been filed. For a wilful violation
of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar action may be taken if scandalous
or indecent matter is inserted.
Rule 11 is mandatory, clear and unequivocal.
The Federal Courts have said that the purpose of Rule 11, F.R.C.P.,
is to hold the attorney of record who signs the pleading to strict accountability, and to keep out of the pleadings false facts and issues which
the signing attorney knows to be false. See, American Auto Assn. v. Rothman,
(D.C.N.Y., 1952) 10iiF. Supp. 6$$| Freeman v. Kirby, (D.C.N.Y., 1961) 27 F.R.D.
395*

According to Freeman v. Kirby, supra, the duty on the attorney is an
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affirmative duty to certify to the pleadings.
This writer confesses that times are changing, lawyers are more bold
and less disciplined, and the public is more intelligent and litigious.
Bar associations are promoting specialisation, efficiency, and the use of
paralegals.

Courts are encouraging laymen

to represent themselves, and

the time may be approaching when lawyers are truly an unnecssary evil in
our society.

This case poses some of the problems squarely for this Court

to speak on.
Counsel for Appellant refused to state into the record who prepared
the answer and counterclaim on file and the trial judge indicated he did
not feel that he had the authority to force such statement in the record
(R. 50~51).

The exact scenario reads as follows:

MR. BRANN: lour Honor, I want answered first who prepared
the answer and counterclaim.
MR. VLAHOS:
MR. BRANN:

None of your business.
I want this in the record, your Honor.

MR. VLAHOS:

It is none of your business.

THE COURT:

He is not willing to tell you.

MR. VLAHOS:

I am prepared to subscribe my name to all pleadings.

MR. BRANN: Well, as I indicated, your Honor, I believe that
an issue in this case is the matter of paralegal people who are not
admitted to the bar practicing law before the bar.
iV

THE COURT: Well, and that may be something that you would
want to produce evidence on, but I don't know I can compel him to
say who prepared the pleadings.
Respondent respectfully suggests that it is a fair inference from the

-lit-
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record the Appellant's counsel did not prepare the answer and counterclaim,
and that his failure to sign the same was not the result of neglect or
inadvertance.

Ihe fact is that the answer and counterclaim does not contain

a signature line for counsel, nor the address of Appellant (R. 12) • This
is not the only experience this writer has had with pleadings not signed
by Appellant's counsel.
Respondent does believe that this Court has authority to ask Appellant's
counsel:

(a) who prepared the answer and counterclaim; (b) did you read

it before it was filed; and (c) was the lack of an attorney's signature
line and signature the result of neglect or inadvertance.
The fact is that Appellant's counsel has an admirable and efficient
legal business involving knowledgeable paralegals who free counsel for
court appearances. Among these paralegals is an individual trained in the
law, but not licensed to practice in the State of Utah, who has jousted
with the Utah State Bar right up to the U. S. Supreme Court for admittance.
See, Sam A. Herscovitz v. Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar,
U07 U. S. 92U, 32 L.Ed. 2d 811, 92 S. Ct. 2l#7.

Some paralegal pleadings

are practically identifiable by the repetitious allegations of wilful
misconduct and enormous prayers for general damages, exemplary damages,
and attorney's fees.
Assuming, for purposes of argument, that such paralegals are smarter,
more able, and more knowledgeable than members of the Bar, the fact remains
that there are no controls unless the Bar, and the judiciary, take control.
A great social and professional issue is involved here that must be carefully
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analyzed and circumscribed with proper consideration given the changing
times.

If there are not any rules governing paralegals, then all lawyers

should be so notified in order that they can remain competitive.
After the foregoing commentary, the Respondent directs its attention
to the arguments made by Appellant.

First, the fact that Appellant signed

her pleading does not rectify the mandatory requirement that counsel must
sign the pleading where Appellant is represented by counsel.

The thrust

of Appellant's argument is that she is now, and was, represented by counsel,
and certainly the pleading was prepared in a law office.

The requirement

of Rule 11, U.R.C.P, cannot be circumvented as a matter of course by the
litigant signing or the attorney certfying to the pleading after the fact.
Respondent concedes that Appellant is entitled to represent herself
in judicial proceedings, but there is not any pretense that she is doing
so in this case.
The case cited by Appellant, namely, West Mountain Lime and Stone Co*
v. DariLey, 38 Utah 218, 111 Pac. 61*7, was decided in 1910. The Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure were adopted in 19U9 and became effective in 19^0.
Presumably, this Court was mindful of the West Mountain lime case, supra,
when it adopted Rule 11, U.R.C.P., and, in any case, the salutory rule in
that case could possibly apply again if inadvertance or neglect were the
reasons for such amission of counsel's signature with subsequent ratification.
Finally, in reference to the case of West Mountain Lime, supra, the
Respondent respectfully suggests:

(a) The defect was timely objected

to in this case by motion; (b) The issue of "retaliatory eviction" was
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

moot by the time of argument to the trial court, since Appellant had vacated
the premises; (c) The answer and counterclaim was dismissed as a "shamj'
but not with prejudice; (d) The Appellant did not submit any meritorious
reason to the trial court, nor does she submit any such reason to this Court,
for the omission of counsel's signature; and (e) A separate tort claim is
not properly joined in unlawful detainer proceedings.
Appellant's counsel argued to the trial court, in substance, and now
argues in his brief on appeal, that he has an absolute right to ignore
Rule 11, U.R.C.P., at the preparation and filing stages of pleadings, and
that the defect is cured by an offer to cure the defect at the court
appearance stage. But this position ignores the authority of the judiciary,
and the right of the adverse party to be assured that a pleading is certified
to by an attorney as having been read by him and that "there is good ground
to support it, and that it is not interposed for delay.11
Respondent respectfully submits that the trial court acted within its
discretion as delineated by Rule 11, U.R.C.P., and that the trial court
would have been remiss in its duty had it not stricken the Appellant's
pleading herein.
POINT IV
APPELLANT'S POINT IV IS WHOLLY IRRELEVANT TO ANT
ISSUES THAT SHE MIGHT MAINTAIN IN THIS APPEAL*

'

It is difficult to frame a responsive headnote to Appellant's rhetorical
Point IV because even Respondent must concede that there are circumstances
under which "retaliatory eviction" may be a defense to unlawful detainer.
-17-
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The fact is that such defense is irrelevant in this appeal proceeding
because:
1.

The issue of eviction became settled and moot prior to the

lover court order herein when Appellant voluntarily vacated the premises
in question, and the premises were tendered back to Respondent during
argument before the lower court and prior to its order herein appealed
fromj and
2.

The Appellant's counterclaim was dismissed as a "sham"

pursuant to Rule 11, U.R.C.P., and Not because it failed to state a claim
or defense*
Ibis Court has always conformed to the basic rule that a judicial
tribunal may consider and determine only an existing controversy, and not
a moot question or abstract proposition.

University of Utah v. Industrial

Commission,6U Utah 273, 276, 229 Pac. 11035 1 C.J.S., Actions, Sec. 17*
The Respondent dislikes being drawn into useless argument over an
irrelevant and collateral issue, but Respondent is also reluctant to appear
to avoid the thirteen pages (1$ to 28) of argument made by Appellant,
which constitutes almost half of her brief.

Also, Respondent frankly wants

an authoritative statement from this Court concerning "retaliatory eviction,lf
and the circumstances under which it might apply,

therefore, the Respondent

respectfully summarizes the conclusions to be derived from said 13 pages of
Appellants brief, namely:
1.

* .

-.-•.,

That "retaliatory eviction" may constitute a defense to an

action for unlawful detainer in cases where law or public policy encourages
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tenants to speak or act, namely, reporting violations of law to public
authorities involving housing, health, safety, workmen's compensation and
civil rights codes.
2.

That some states have enacted legislation pertaining to

"retaliatory evictions •tl
3. That Appellant claims a constitutional right to commandeer
the Respondent's apartment house complex, designate the management thereof,
and determine the rules and regulations under which Appellant is willing to
live while residing on Respondents property.
An extensive discussion and analysis of the concept of retaliatory
eviction with cases cited is found in 3 Utah Law Review, Fall, 1973* at
pages $03 et seq.

The case of Aluli v. Trusdell, 508 P.2d 1217, Hawaii

1973* is criticised in said article as a "backward step,11 but the fact is
that even Hawaii, in the vanguard of tenants rights, found it must give the
landlord some rights*
The Respondent again respectfully directs the Court's attention to the
following undisputed facts contained in the record and the Appellant's
brief, namely, that Respondent's property is a "non-slum apartment complex"
(App. Br., 1J>), that Appellant made no complaints to public authorities
concerning conditions adverse to health, welfare, or safety on the premises
(R. 8-12, inc.), that Appellantwas a "month to month" tenant under a
written lease (R. 3 ) , and that Respondent followed the law announced by
the Utah legislature and this Court in its effort to regain possession of
the premises with liberal periods of time given Appellant between the time
-19-
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the notice to quit was served and this action was commenced.

The Appellant

was served with a notice to quit on June 10, 1975, this action was filed
on July 25, 197$, defendant was served with process July 31 , 1915$ and the
answer was not filed until August 21, 1975*

The Appellant, according to

her counsel's version, quit the premises on or about September 6, 1975*
(R. U7), and the premises were not formally tendered to Respondent until
argument on September 10, 1975, (R. U7 & U8).
The Utah legislature has not seen fit to adopt a proposed model
landlord-tenant code, although it is reported that such code was vigorously
debated and thereupon rejected in the last special session of the legislature.
Respondent does not argue the fact that the legislature has the authority
to enact landlord-tenant laws, but that is a different matter from asking
this Court to legislate.
The thrust of Appellant's argument in this case is that the Appellant
has an absolute and constitutionally guaranteed right to free speech
which is a defense to eviction in all cases. Appellant, in effect,
contends that Respondent, as a private citizen and property owner, may
be compelled to submit to verbal abuse and thereby forfeit its right
to select its tenants and manage its properties. Appellant has not
cited in thirteen pages of its brief, insofar as Respondent can determine,
one case which holds that the bare right of free speech is a defense to
eviction.

Every case cited by Appellant appears to involve a public

policy issue such as race relations, or making of complaints to public

-20-
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authorities concerning a breach of the landlord's duties imposed by lav*
The Appellant notes that the apartment house complex in this case is not
a slum property (App. Br. 15>), and Appellant makes no mention in her pleadings or brief of complaints made to any public authority.

The Appellant

claims as a defense the bare right to organize a tenant's union, to
instruct Respondent as to who it can employ to manage the premises, and
to determine what rules and regulations are appropriate to the convenience
of Appellant.
Respondent respectfully directs the Court's attention to the growth
of multiple unit dwellings where many people of different ages and inclinations must live together and remain civilized.

The landlords are

regularly sued nowdays for failure to control their tenants and tenants1
pets, for failure to repair, for failure not to get consent before
repairing, for failure to evict, for failure to regulate and provide
rules, in this case for evicting, and so on ad nauseam.
The Respondent respectfully submits that the issue of retaliatory
eviction is moot in this case, and, in any event, that Appellant has
failed to present a fact situation where the defense of retaliatory
eviction might be available to her in this case.
CONCLUSION

The findings and judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.
The allegations of Respondent's complaint, and the lower court's findings
thereon, are uncontroverted in every respect.

The answer and counter-
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claim filed by Appellant did not comply with the express requirements
of Rule 11, U.R.C.P., and the lower court1 s judgment thereon is in
compliance with said Rule.
Respectfully submitted,

Attorney
attorney for Respondent
Richard W. Brann
U06 Kiesel Building
Ogden, Utah 8U*01

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of Respondent's brief,
postage prepaid, this y L — ' d a y of December, 197$, to Appellant's
attorney, Pete N. Vlahos, Esq., 2kk7 Kiesel Avenue, Ogden, Utah, 8Ui01•

Lu,J

Attorney for Respondent
Richard W. Brann
1*06 Kiesel Building
Ogden, Utah 61*1*01
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Legal /via

\More Services Are Performed by Paralegals;
\ Attorneys Have Mixed Feeling About Trend
By PHILIP REYZIN

f poor clients at the Brooklyn law center, also it hadn't been done at all before paralegals

j has no plans for law school: " I can do just were hired," she says.
Pat Hausberg, J o Ann Tackovich and) about anything I want to now," she says. "I W o r k i n g in t h e P u b l i c S e c t o r
Probably the closest paralegals come to
Mayda Estremera a r e doing legal work with-' just don't get paid a s much as a lawyer."
out a license, but they aren't breaking the' • Paralegals start at $10,000 to $11,000 at law acting a s practicing attorneys is in the pubfirms
in
New
York,
and
m
a
y
work
up
to
lic sector, involved in work similar to that of
law.
The three work, respectively, at a big $16,000; fledgling lawyers, by contrast, start Miss Estremera in Brooklyn. She spends
most of her time representing welfare
Wall Street law firm, the legal department at $18,000 to $20,000. >
And Mrs. Tackovich, who processes " a clients at hearings to protest rulings on their
of Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. in Akron,
literal
mountain
of
paperwork"
relating
to
benefits. The hearings aren't held in a court\ and at a neighborhood law center in Brook-'
iyn.
! tire failure claims and other product liabil- room before a judge, so a non-lawyer can
They are paralegals, a new and rapidly 1 ity cases at Goodyear, adds that being a advise a client. Unlike many paralegals,
spreading breed of law practitioners who paralegal is already a step up from her old Miss Estremera had no formal paralegal
have never been to law school, but who have work as legal secretary. "You can set your schooling; she picked up her expertise dur.had legal training. They a r e showing up in own priorities, and you're not so much un- ing a stint as a VISTA volunteer.
Most others get on-the-job training in law
increasing numbers in law firms, corpora- der the minute-by-minute supervision of an
tions and government offices around the attorney," she says. "The title holds more firms or take courses at schools that offer
U.S. If the system works, they should be an status, too. You're treated as a professional, from four months to two years of classes at
fees of up to $2,200. At this point, they do not
important, factor in holding down legal costs with more consideration."
have to be licensed after leaving school, but
and bringing legal services to many who **A G r o w i n g F i e l d "
with the growth in the trade and the interest
currently can't afford them.
Whatever the reasons for joining it, "This
Most attorneys a r e behind the idea of is a tremendously growing field." says Al- of bar associations, it appears certain that
using paralegals, in theory, anyway. But in bert Greenstone, president of the National attempts to require some sort of qualifying
practice many, find themselves taking an Center for Paralegal Training in New York.. will also grow.
In theory, there should be an immediate
ambivalent stance: They a r e increasingly "Six or seven years ago nobody was using
unsure whether to embrace the paralegals people specifically designated as legal as- benefit to clients in the form of lower costs
as drones who will relieve them of tedium or sistants. Now, 98r/V of the firms with 50 or resulting from use of paralegals, according ,
to shun them as trespassers on hallowed le- more lawyers use them, and about half the to Kenneth Pringle, Minot. N.D.. a t t o r n e y
gal ground and a threat to the system of firms with 25 to 50 lawyers have legal assist- who heads the ABA committee on legal assistants, the association's formal name for
jurisprudence.
ants."
"We call them p a r a l e t h a l s , " says one disEstimates a r e that there a r e more than paralegals. He says lower charges will be
dainful New York lawyer who feels that se- 70,000 paralegals at work, with 20,000 scat- automatic since lawyers a r e supposed to bill
rious mistakes could result from reliance on tered through local, state and federal gov- their clients at a lower r a t e for work done
legal help without proper legal training.
ernment offices and most of the rest with by paralegals.
The mixed emotions show up in the posi- law 'firms or companies. The number of
But the greatest public benefit from
tion of the American Bar Association, which schools offering training h a s also soared.
lower legal costs will be that more citizens
says it supports the use of paralegals but There are 161 p r o g r a m s in paralegal trainwill be able to afford legal help, says Mr.
wants a hand in their training and licensing. ing being offered now, up from two in 1970
Fry of the National Paralegal Institute. " I t ' s
On the surface, that may seem helpful, but and zero in 1968, according to Blackstone
estimated that there a r e 140 million citizens
William Fry, executive director of the Na- Associates, a Washington research and conin this country who have legal problems but
tional Paralegal Institute in Washington, sulting concern.
•
can't afford to pay $25 to $50 or more an
says, "The bar association sees paralegals
John Stein, Blackstone vice president, hour for an attorney." he says. "Paralegals
as a hell of a threat.
says not only a r e there more paralegals, but have the potential to handle a majority of
A Competing Profession?
j lawyers a r e delegating far more work to these problems, at a price people could af"They feel that if they don't control it, them. "The b a r is finally waking up to the ford to pay."
Another fertile area for future use of parthrough regulation oC the training and li- fact that lawyers have been doing a lot of
censing, it will run away from them," and work they really had no business doing. alegals is in pre-paid legal plans, also known
paralegals will emerge as a competing pro- They are finding that the whole process of as "legal insurance." Some large labor
fession, says Mr. F r y , head of the institute, delegating some work leads to better repre- unions are experimenting with it now, providing members legal protection for a fixed
which trains paralegals under federal grants sentation for the client."
There a r e , of course, some jobs parale- fee, much- like medical insurance. Paralefor public service positions.
Part of the problem is that the influx of gals can't do, such as argue cases in court, gals are "absolutely essential if legal insurparalegals is coming at the same time that give legal advice to a client for a fee, or do ance is ever to come through on a wide
a glowing number of law graduates going tasks such a s taking depositions which scale," at an affordable cost, says Xenia
into practice is becoming a problem. Some courts have ruled must be done by a lawyer. Krinitzky, president of the New York City
But that still leaves plenty for the parale- Paralegal Association.
lawyers see paralegals' making that situagals. Miss Hausberg, the Wall Street paraletion worse:
Looking further ahead, Miss Capistrant.
"It's like a steamroller," says Leonard gal, says she h a s " h a d my hand in a little who is president of the Capital Area ParaRivkind. past president of the Miami Beach bit of everything" during three years at two legal
Association,
sees
major
gains
Bar Association and a member of the Flor- large law firms. She drafts the final version resulting from paralegals setting up shop.on
ida bar's committee on the unauthorized of corporate minutes from notes assembled their own, rather than working for lawyers:
practice of law. "These paralegals are tak- by company officials and h a s recently pre- "I think that maybe five or 10 years from
ing away jobs," he says. "If someone wants pared research documents on tax shelters now, people with a year or two of training
to practice law. let him go to law school, get and on licensing of broker-dealers in various will be able t a t a k e an exam, get a license,
states.
a license and practice."
and do a will for $50, or a divorce for $100.Connie Capistrant, a paralegal at a It's coming."
Many paralegals, however, say they have
no interest in spending the time or money it Washington law firm, indexes documents,
would take to go to law school, but they still digests depositions and works on an inforwant to do legal work. "I like my job, and I mation retrieval system to be used in a
by the Howard
W. antitrust
Hunter Lawcase.
Library,Other
J. Reuben
Clark Law School, BYU.
complex
paralegals
don't see any reason to go to Digitized
law school,"
Machine-generated
OCR,
may contain
a variety of
tasks
relatederrors.
to the
says Miss Hausberg, who once planned to handle
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOCRNAL

Law School Grads
WASHINGTON (AP) - Job
prospects for law school graduates, already tight, are expected to remain bleak for at
least the next 10 years with the
number of graduates expected
to outpace the number of job
openings, the Labor Department reported Saturday.
A study n the current issue
of the department's Occupational Outlook Quarterly^ says that
more than 20,000 job openings a
year are foreseen for lawyers
through 1985.
Although not all graduates
enter practice, the study said
supply will continue to outpace
demand with the number of
graduates rising from 28,300
this year to an estimated 33,600
in 1985.
According to the study: "Today's tight job market could resolve itself, some optimists say,
by forcing tomorrow's law students to have different expectations — fewer of themt
seeking an actual job as a law^
yer.
"A law degree could come to
be valued primarily as certification of high accomplishment
in the liberal arts. But, for the
immediate future at least,
many new law graduates will]
be disappointed and forced to
change their career plans.
"The economy, consequently,
is required to live with a wasteful process and forego the full
use of valuable, specialized
skills/*
i
The study noted that the
number of people practicing
law has increased by more
than 100,000 since the early
1960s, reaching a total of about
342,000 in 1974. During the same
period, the number of law
school graduates increased
about threefold.
Law school admission policies
apparently were a major factor
in the oversupply, the study
said, explaining that while
many colleges offer prelaw pro-

grams, undergraduate training
in almost any field is accepted
by law schools as proper preparation for admittance.
Because of this, in recent
years, many undergraduates
chose to enter law school as the
job market in the physical and
biological sciences tightened::**
Also, law has become popular
for social reasons, with the-degree now viewed as "an important key to full participation in
constructive legal, political and
economic changes," the study
said.
•'.;**'

Jobs Fe
PARALEGALS
L e g a l assistants: Who needs
them? The real question is: Who
couldn't use one? The legal assistant,
under the supervision of a lawyer, is
able to give direct assistance in handling all matters, from preparing and
interpreting legal documents to
analyzing and handling procedural
problems that involve independent
decisions.
In the law office, the duties of
paralegals, as they are sometimes
called, are limited only by the practice
of the employer-attorney. Paralegals
assume many of the routine administrative and time-consuming duties
formerly borne by the attorney.
At the same time, they are more accessible than the attorney, and can
spend time interviewing the clients,
and giving them more personal attention. This gives the attorney more
time for productive legal work, and
keeps the clients satisfied.
It's not just within the law offices
that paralegals are serving a need. In
our courts, paralegals can be found in
many positions, among them law librarian, court administrator, and
chief deputy. Their duties are varied,
but they all help to expedite necessary
procedures handled every day in
court.
So, if you're finding that you're having trouble answering all of your calls,
completing all your research, and
drafting all of your procedures, perhaps what you need is a legal assistant. The legal assistant's services can
be had at a reasonable price, and he or
she offers invaluable assistance in all
areas.
I In any of the given fields, the
j paralegal can develop and modify procedures, detail procedures for practicing in certain fields of law, research,
compile, and use information from the
law library, and keep everyone up-todate on the current cases in the office.
The list of things paralegals can do
, is endless. They serve a distinct need.
1
And operating within established
ethical guidelines, they are bringing
j initiative, knowledge, training, and
j dedication to their jobs.
I
—•
Mary Ellen Buehring, PLS, CPS, is
Public Relations Chairman of the National A ssociation of Legal A ssistants,
Inc.
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